S4h Game Theory Iterated

Analyses long-run repeated interactions — how cooperation forms, how trust is built, how defection spirals start, and which strategies sustain cooperation. Triggers: 'repeated game', 'iterated strategy', 'long-run relationship', 'reputation effects', 'how do I sustain cooperation', 'tit for tat', 'shadow of the future', 'will they defect', 'ongoing relationship after betrayal', 'how do we recover from this'.

242 stars 25 forksOther

Install

skills CLI (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex and more)
npx skills add human-avatar/skills-for-humanity --skill s4h-game-theory-iterated
Manual install
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/human-avatar/skills-for-humanity.git /tmp/skills-for-humanity
mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills
cp -r /tmp/skills-for-humanity/skills/s4h-game-theory-iterated ~/.claude/skills/s4h-game-theory-iterated

Personal skills live in ~/.claude/skills. Use .claude/skills in a project folder to share a skill with your team.

From the SKILL.md

# Game Theory: Iterated Games

Robert Axelrod's 1984 computer tournament is one of the most important results in social science. He invited game theorists to submit strategies for an iterated prisoners' dilemma — a repeated game where the same two players interact over and over. The simplest strategy submitted, Tit for Tat (cooperate on the first move, then do exactly what your opponent did on the previous move), won both rounds of the tournament, beating every more complex strategy.

Why Tit for Tat wins: it is *nice* (starts by cooperating, never the first to defect), *retaliatory* (immediately punishes defection — there is no free lunch), *forgiving* (returns to cooperation as soon as the opponent does — does not hold grudges), and *clear* (the strategy is transparent and easy for the opponent to understand). Opponents who try to exploit it get punished; opponents who cooperate get rewarded. It is the most robust known strategy for sustained cooperation without trust.

The folk theorem establishes the theoretical foundation: in infinitely (or indefinitely) repeated games with sufficiently patient players, almost any outcome — including full cooperation — can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium, because the threat of future punishment makes defection unprofitable. The key variable is the *discount factor* (how much players value future payoffs relative to present ones), and whether punishment is *credible* and *observable*.

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## Your Process

**Step 1: Stage game**
Read the full skill on GitHub

Details

Skill name
s4h-game-theory-iterated
Path
skills/s4h-game-theory-iterated/SKILL.md
License
MIT
Repo updated
15 July 2026

FAQ

What does the S4h Game Theory Iterated skill do?

Analyses long-run repeated interactions — how cooperation forms, how trust is built, how defection spirals start, and which strategies sustain cooperation. Triggers: 'repeated game', 'iterated strategy', 'long-run relationship', 'reputation effects', 'how do I sustain cooperation', 'tit for tat', 'shadow of the future', 'will they defect', 'ongoing relationship after betrayal', 'how do we recover from this'.

How do I install the S4h Game Theory Iterated skill?

skills CLI (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex and more): npx skills add human-avatar/skills-for-humanity --skill s4h-game-theory-iterated. Skills go in ~/.claude/skills (personal) or .claude/skills (project), and Claude loads them automatically when a task matches the description.

Is S4h Game Theory Iterated popular?

It lives in human-avatar/skills-for-humanity, which has 242 GitHub stars and 25 forks, and is included in 1 curated skill list.

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