Grad Signaling
Apply signaling theory (Spence, 1973) to analyze how agents communicate private information through costly, credible signals under information asymmetry. Use this skill when the user needs to evaluate whether a corporate action serves as a credible signal, analyze dividend or IPO signaling, assess separating vs pooling equilibria, or when they ask 'why do firms pay dividends', 'is this signal credible', or 'how does underpricing signal quality'.
Install
npx skills add asgard-ai-platform/skills --skill grad-signalinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/asgard-ai-platform/skills.git /tmp/skills
mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills
cp -r /tmp/skills/grad-signaling ~/.claude/skills/grad-signalingPersonal skills live in ~/.claude/skills. Use .claude/skills in a project folder to share a skill with your team.
From the SKILL.md
# Signaling Theory ## Overview Signaling theory (Spence, 1973) explains how informed parties credibly communicate private information to uninformed parties through costly actions. In finance, firms signal quality through dividends, capital structure, underpricing, and other mechanisms that are too costly for low-quality firms to mimic. ## When to Use - Analyzing why firms pay dividends despite tax disadvantage - Evaluating IPO underpricing as a quality signal - Assessing whether a corporate action conveys credible private information - Designing mechanisms to separate high-quality from low-quality issuers ## When NOT to Use - When information asymmetry is minimal (both sides have equal information) - For cheap-talk communication (costless signals are not credible) - When the signaling cost exceeds the benefit to the signaler ## Assumptions ``` IRON LAW: A signal is credible ONLY if it is costly to fake — cheap talk is not a signal. For a separating equilibrium, the signal must be differentially costly: affordable for high-quality types but prohibitively expensive for low-quality types. ``` Key assumptions: 1. Information asymmetry exists between sender and receiver 2. Signal cost is negatively correlated with quality (single-crossing property) 3. Receivers rationally update beliefs based on observed signals 4. Equilibrium can be separating (types distinguished) or pooling (types indistinguishable) ## Methodology ### Step 1 — Identify Asymmetry and Parties
Details
- Skill name
grad-signaling- Repository
- asgard-ai-platform/skills
- Path
grad-signaling/SKILL.md- License
- MIT
- Repo updated
- 6 June 2026
FAQ
What does the Grad Signaling skill do?
Apply signaling theory (Spence, 1973) to analyze how agents communicate private information through costly, credible signals under information asymmetry. Use this skill when the user needs to evaluate whether a corporate action serves as a credible signal, analyze dividend or IPO signaling, assess separating vs pooling equilibria, or when they ask 'why do firms pay dividends', 'is this signal credible', or 'how does underpricing signal quality'.
How do I install the Grad Signaling skill?
skills CLI (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex and more): npx skills add asgard-ai-platform/skills --skill grad-signaling. Skills go in ~/.claude/skills (personal) or .claude/skills (project), and Claude loads them automatically when a task matches the description.
Is Grad Signaling popular?
It lives in asgard-ai-platform/skills, which has 248 GitHub stars and 30 forks.
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