Grad Info Economics
Apply information economics to diagnose and remedy market failures caused by asymmetric information. Use this skill when the user needs to analyze adverse selection, moral hazard, or signaling and screening mechanisms, especially in insurance, labor, credit, or product quality markets.
Install
npx skills add asgard-ai-platform/skills --skill grad-info-economicsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/asgard-ai-platform/skills.git /tmp/skills
mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills
cp -r /tmp/skills/grad-info-economics ~/.claude/skills/grad-info-economicsPersonal skills live in ~/.claude/skills. Use .claude/skills in a project folder to share a skill with your team.
From the SKILL.md
# Information Economics: Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Signaling ## Overview Information economics studies how asymmetric information between parties causes market failures and shapes institutional responses. Akerlof's "market for lemons" shows adverse selection can collapse entire markets; Spence's signaling model shows informed parties can credibly convey quality through costly actions; Rothschild-Stiglitz screening shows uninformed parties can design menus that induce self-selection. Together, these frameworks explain why markets for insurance, credit, labor, and used goods systematically deviate from the competitive ideal and why institutions like warranties, credentials, and regulation exist. ## When to Use - Diagnosing why a market is failing or shrinking (quality collapse, credit rationing, insurance death spirals) - Evaluating whether a signal (degree, certification, warranty) is credible and efficient - Designing screening mechanisms (menus, deductibles, trial periods) to sort heterogeneous agents - Assessing policy interventions (mandatory disclosure, minimum standards, subsidized insurance) ## When NOT to Use - Information is symmetric or costlessly verifiable (no asymmetry problem) - The product is a pure experience good where reputation and repeat purchase fully resolve quality uncertainty - The analysis requires modeling strategic interaction beyond bilateral (use full game-theoretic models) ## Assumptions
Details
- Skill name
grad-info-economics- Repository
- asgard-ai-platform/skills
- Path
grad-info-economics/SKILL.md- License
- MIT
- Repo updated
- 6 June 2026
FAQ
What does the Grad Info Economics skill do?
Apply information economics to diagnose and remedy market failures caused by asymmetric information. Use this skill when the user needs to analyze adverse selection, moral hazard, or signaling and screening mechanisms, especially in insurance, labor, credit, or product quality markets.
How do I install the Grad Info Economics skill?
skills CLI (Claude Code, Cursor, Codex and more): npx skills add asgard-ai-platform/skills --skill grad-info-economics. Skills go in ~/.claude/skills (personal) or .claude/skills (project), and Claude loads them automatically when a task matches the description.
Is Grad Info Economics popular?
It lives in asgard-ai-platform/skills, which has 248 GitHub stars and 30 forks.
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